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Abstract : Free, libre  or open source software (FLOSS) is  nowadays produced not  only by individual  
benevolent  developers  but,  in  a  growing  proportion,  by  firms  that  hire  programmers  for  their  own  
objectives  of  development  in  open source or  for  contributing  to open source projects  in the  context  of  
dedicated communities. A recent literature has focused on the question of the business models explaining  
how and why firms may draw benefits from such involvement and their connected activities. They can be  
considered as the building blocks of a new modus operandi of an industry, built on an alternative approach  
to intellectual property management. Its prospects will depend on both the firms' willingness to rally and its  
ability to compete with the traditional “proprietary” approach. As a matter of fact firms' involvement in  
FLOSS,  while  growing,  remains  very  contrasted,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  products  and  the  
characteristics of the markets. The paper asks why do for-profit firms contribute to FLOSS development and  
why  some  firms  contribute  more  than  the  others.  The  common  explanation  is  that  FLOSS  is  often  a  
complement to proprietary software (or hardware or services) that the for-profit  firm sells at a positive  
price. We present an alternative explanation based the users' skill level. When users are skilled, opening the  
software is likely to result in a better product because the user base will contribute improvements (find  
bugs, write fixes and produce new features). We introduce the concept of the dominant user's skill and we  
set  up  a  theoretical  model  to  better  understand  how it  may  condition  the  nature  and  outcome  of  the  
competition between a FLOSS firm and a proprietary firm. We discuss these results in the light of empirical  
stylized facts drawn from the recent trends in the software industry.
1. Introduction  
“Free”/“libre”  or  “open  source”  software  (FLOSS)  is  software  whose  source-code,  that  is  the  explicit 
expression of the programming work, remains  openly accessible.  Until  recently,  FLOSS was considered 
only  to  be   of  interest  to  programmers  motivated  by the  building  and  sharing  of  a  base  of  programs 
developed for their own needs (Lakhani & von Hippel (2003),  Demazière & al. (2006)). 
Today FLOSS has apparently become an economic issue of considerable importance. This is remarkably 
illustrated,  in  the  case  of  Europe is   by the  publication of a,  important  report  on this  subject    by the 
European Commission at the end of year 2006 1. In industrial terms, the open source model has widely stuck 
*The authors thank warmly the two anonymous referres for their excellent reports and suggestions and the EMR editors for the very 
accurate advice they gave us for the improvement of the paper. We are indebted for helpful comments to the participants of the 
Conferences and seminars where we had the opportunity to present the project of this paper, more particularly the DIME London 
Conference  “Intellectual  Property  Rights  for  Business  and  Society”,  Birbeck  University,  14 th and  15th September  2006,  the 
international  conference  « The diffusion  of  FLOSS and  the  Organisation  of  the  Software  Industry :  From Social  Networks  to 
Economic and Legal Models », Nice Sophia-Antipolis, May 31st, June 1st 2007, the Complex Markets Workshop, Warwick Business 
School, March 31st - April 2d 2008. This research has benefited from the support of the Institut Telecom (France), the French ANR 
and the European STREP “Complex Markets”.
1 “ « FLOSS is good for the European economy,  employment and firms competitiveness... » http://ec.europa.eu/enter-
prise/ict/policy/doc/2006-11-20-flossimpact.pdf.
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out the limits of the computer industry to to affect other IT fields like the  telecommunications industry2. It 
appear nowadays to be at stake of very important  competition issues as a growing number of industrial 
actors, including Microsoft itself, have eventually acknowledge. Today, open source software is increasingly 
integrated into many commercial offers (Novell, buying Ximian and SuSE, Sun open-sourcing its operating 
system, IBM open-sourcing its development tool software Eclipse, even Microsoft, deciding to distribute 
some of its software products under open license3). This situation, in which commercial business relies on 
the existence and durability of non-market activities, challenges traditional industrial economic theory. 
As in  any cooperative  agreement  devoted  to  technology or  knowledge development,  agents  pool  assets 
together in a “pre-competitive” phase and share the products of their efforts before returning to competition 
(Crémer & al. (1990), Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006)). But such agreements remain closed to third parties. 
On the contrary a FLOSS project is an open contribution game in which the list of players is not bounded 
ex-ante by a cooperative agreement and the output of which is a public good that cannot be appropriated by 
any of the players on an exclusive way. This would rather correspond to the formation of a consortium for 
the production of a standard4.
Scholars see this phenomenon as an extreme case of 'open innovation'5 (Chesbrough, 2003), and thus of a 
laboratory of innovation production in some Internet based/knowledge based industry. This radically brand 
new way of producing software challenges the foundations and competition regime of the software industry 
which was  evolving more towards  strengthening the intellectual  property protection (Bessen and Hunt, 
2007).Two radically opposed ways of working are confronting each other, based on two opposing views 
about intellectual property management.  On the one hand, the “traditional” position, referred here as the 
“proprietary”  approach,  defends the  need to strengthen the  intellectual  property regime to respond to a 
growing  ease  with  which  of  software  codes  can  be  appropriated  and  used  without  any  fee6 .  FLOSS 
defenders, on the other hand, argue that this  position is inefficient for innovation dynamics, reinforcing the 
market  power  of  the  sole  dominant  firms  and  thus  the  oligopolistic  nature  of  the  industry  which  is 
economically inefficient7.
The result of this confrontation is then of huge importance for the future of the software industry and, more 
widely, for the whole information and communication industry. From an even broader perspective, this case 
of open source software can be viewed as a precursor of what could also take place in a wider array of 
industries where innovation has a strong role to play in competition and requires to access to a larger and 
larger range of knowledge and resources.
This confrontation appeals for a better understanding of how FLOSS open innovation works, ie how firms 
turn FLOSS products into business,  what  is the level  of  investments  firms have to make to exploit  this 
production  on the  market,  and especially how far  they have to involve into the  cooperative  production 
process to do so. 
The paper asks why do for-profit firms contribute to FLOSS development and why some firms contribute 
more than the others. The common explanation is that FLOSS is often a complement to proprietary software 
(or  hardware  or  services)  that  the  for-profit  firm  sells  at  a  positive  price.  We  present  an  alternative 
explanation based the users' skill level. When users are skilled, opening the software is likely to result in a 
2 Regarding voice on IP, FLOSS Asterisk, http://www.asterisk.org/, is one of the most popular choices. Motorola has se-
lected Linux as one of three operating systems for its mobile terminals.
3 http://solutions.journaldunet.com/0404/040407_microsoft.shtml
4 What we mean is that a player offers a standard by developing a software that the other players can adopt and help to develop. This 
“unilateral” adoption is usually called ‘bandwagon’ in the literature on standards (see, for instance, Farrell and Saloner, 1985). 
5  Defined as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, 
and internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance their technology” (Chesbrough, 2006).
6 See, for instance, the arguments developed by the Business Software Alliance (BSA), which regroups the main actors of the  
software sector, such as IBM, Microsoft,  Apple, Sybase, etc. on  http://www.bsa.org/, especially their latest white paper (August 
2008, http://www.bsa.org/country/Research%20and%20Statistics/~/media/96FC7EAFF3E84436AF62C3B393F207B1.ashx)
7 See the arguments of the Free Software Foundation (http://www.fsf.org), or Boldrin and Levine (2007) .
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better product because the user base will contribute improvements (find bugs, write fixes and produce new 
features).8
In the last decade, an abundant and growing literature has discussed this question. According to us, it can be 
split into two approaches, two points of views, ie two data sources, the first looking at the production side 
and the second at the market side to explain firms' interest regarding FLOSS.
The production side starts from the communities and evaluates the level and way of the involvement of 
firms into them. The research agenda, as put forward by Von Hippel & Von Krogh (2003) is to understand 
how firms invest themselves into a specific community and what these communities can provide to them. 
From an organization science point  of  view, the question is  how agents organize themselves to manage 
distributed  innovation and in which conditions  firms can capture  a  part  of  this  innovation for  business 
purpose. The asset of such studies is the availability of data from communities. Their exploitation leads to 
crucial results for understanding the links between business and open source.
In 2005,  Lakhani  & Wolf  (2005),  analysing  a  survey of  287 communities  (ie  people  active  in  FLOSS 
development  projects)  show the importance of  the business  participation  to FLOSS communities,  as “a 
majority of [their] respondents are skilled and experienced professionals working in IT-related jobs, with 
approximately 40 percent being paid to participate in the F/OSS project.”
Henkel (2006), while studying the “embedded” Linux system, has shown that business involvement pursued 
several strategies and that firms did not reveal all the codes they produced but rather carefully selected their 
contributions. Dahlander & Wallin (2006) looking at the “GNOME” graphic interface project, and standing 
on  Teece  (1986)'s  theory,  defend  the  idea  that,  hiring  developers  who  participate  to  this  development 
project, these firms try to control a complementary asset important for building their products and services. 
This  enlightens  IBM's  strategy of  supporting  and  investing  in  the  development  of  Linux  while  selling 
hardware (mainframe), software (Lotus suite) and services. “A complementary asset that exists outside firm 
boundaries and outside their ownership or hierarchical control”(Dahlander and Wallin, 2006). This is even 
the sole control means when innovations, as observed by Von Hippel (2005) are produced by a community 
of innovative users that protect their innovation from a private appropriation through a GPL license9. 
Iansiti & Richards (2006) identify, amongst the various FLOSS projects a  “money-driven cluster” where 
« IT vendors’ motives are economic. In this cluster, significant investments have been made in projects that 
will serve as complementary assets to drive revenues to vendors’ core businesses ».
However, these authors have looked at already well established communities, where the software developed 
is shared by numerous actors, people or firms. This may hardly explain why some companies, like MySQL 
AB, which owns the entire eponymous database software , open source it and, still, remain responsible for 
the majority of its development, as if it was the core asset of their business10.
On the other hand, from a strategy and management sciences point of view, some scholars have looked at 
the business side and explained the use of FLOSS products by the characteristics of the market and firms' 
positioning on this market. The two main questions here are the definition of a business model (what do you 
sell  when  choosing  FLOSS?),  and  the  links  between  a  business  model  and  the  involvement  into 
communities. 
Chang & al. (2007) have surveyed  the literature on the different “FLOSS business models”,  and classified 
them “into five types: (a) Support Contracts; (b) Split Licensing; (c) Community; (d) Valued-added closed 
source;  (e)   Macro R&D Infrastructure”.  They have looked at  the advantage and disadvantage of each 
models, proposing a case study for each, but without investigating the involvement into the communities, 
and the  market condition into which each model is the most efficient.
8This concise formulation of our concern has been suggested by one of our anonymous reviewer.
9 The main principle of the GPL (General Public Licence) is to make its adopters disclose the source-code of the programs concerned 
and of any further  improvement  if they circulate them, as well  as the free circulation  of the code under  the sole condition of 
maintaining its "open" character. 
10 This means that any developer/contributor wanting to make a contribution to the official MySQL product,  she has to transfer her 
copyright  to  MySQL.  http://forge.mysql.com/contribute/cla.php.  Once owning the whole  copyright,  the firm can manage a dual 
licensing scheme, distributing the product under the license she wants, either GPL or more classical closed license. So a customer 
that whishes not to reveal further enhancements of the source code has to maintain by herself these enhancements.
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Surveying Italian firms, Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli & Rossi (2006), have proposed a definition of “FLOSS 
based business” and  different reasons for firms participating to FLOSS development. But they have not 
really  explained  the  link  between  the  kind  of  business  model  and  the  degree  of  involvement  into 
communities.
The first to have set up this link between these two aspects are Finnish scholars. Surveying Finnish firms, 
Dahlander and Magnusson (2005, 2008) have shown that, in a large extent the variety of firms' involvement 
into FLOSS can be understood in the light of the place of the software in the firm's business model (as core 
activity or not). Still on Finish firms data, but at product level, Kosky (2007) has remarked that “it seems 
that factors other than those typically found to explain differences in entrepreneurial  innovation behaviour 
such as  firm size and age account  for  the  differences  in the  product  and license  type  strategies of  the 
software companies. [His] data indicate that the firm ownership structure has a major influence for  the 
software firms’ product-level business strategies” (p. 123).
If these studies prove the link between the market and the involvement into FLOSS, they suffer from some 
limitations. They are rather descriptive and do not propose explanations of the variation of firms' behaviour 
in similar markets: why Asus or Dell put Linux on their computer without participating to the development 
when HP or IBM do? This may be because these authors look at firm's level without trying to look at the 
differences  between  the  different  branch  of  the  industry,  as West  (2003)  could  have  done  on  the 
server/operating system market (what he called “platform market”). 
So, our present work belongs to this second category of approaches It tries to systematize West's approach 
to the whole Information Technology industry . Our major concern is the following: how could we explain 
that, in similar branches regarding the place of the software, or the network effects (like business solution 
markets), there are sometimes a bunch of market successful firms sponsoring FLOSS offers (such as content 
management  systems,  or  data  base  tools)  and  in  others  no  market  successful  one  (like  for  business 
intelligence).
The  argument  we  will  put  forward  in  this  paper  is  that  these  differences  can  be  explained  by  the 
characteristics of the demand, and more particularly of the users skills. As Von Hippel (1988) explained, 
when clients are skilled users, capable to express their needs and even to develop prototypes, they are in the 
best position to propose innovations, even if firms are needed to industrialize them. To this argument we 
will add that when users, in the opposite situation, are unskilled and do not understand source code, they 
rather tend to assimilate the advantages of  a free software with those of a freeware, that is obtainable free 
of charge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, using stylised facts, we show how the level of 
skills of the users can conditions the nature and issue of the competition in the computer industry and, thus 
the place of FLOSS strategies, bringing us to introduce the concept of “dominant user's skill”. In section 3, 
to formally show the implications of this demand characteristic on the firm's choices, we present a formal 
competition  model  in  which  two  firms,  one  open-source  and  one  proprietary  compete  for  a  market 
characterized by a given distribution of users' skills. In a conclusive section 4 we discuss the lessons and the 
managerial and industrial economics implications of the model outcomes and we conclude on the limits and 
further extensions of the paper.. 
2. IT industry, attitudes toward FLOSS, and the dominant user's skill.  
1. FLOSS involvement and the role of the users.
Since  the  mid-1990s,  a  growing number  of  commercial  firm,  either  new entrants  or  incumbents,  have 
decided to integrate FLOSS products in their  own specific offer or toolboxes, even investing by different 
means in FLOSS development. Of course these new emerging strategies must be understood in the light of 
IP protection prevailing in each market segment and the need to strengthen competitive advantages or to rely 
on new ones. 
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Regarding the degree of involvement in FLOSS dynamics,  the more active actors seems to be found in 
sectors where software development and use is either a core activity or a crucial condition for performances, 
as it is the case for server manufacturers or architects  of information systems (adoption of Linux by IBM, 
HP since the beginning of the years 2000). At the other extreme, the weakest involvement is found amongst 
hardware suppliers that can only feel concerned by FLOSS for compatibility and price purposes.
When FLOSS adoption is related to marginal aspects of differentiation, it seems to have little impact on 
industrial structure and competition. This is generally the case for most of hardware producers, when hard-
soft-content  is  no  longer  bundled  (servers,  computers,  Personal  Communication  Tools,  DVD and MP3 
players...) 
Surprisingly, FLOSS diffusion impacts mainly firms in software based industries. This has to be understood 
regarding how their core competences have evolved and shifted significantly. Their main challenge is less 
and less to supply a “software solution” to a given problem at a given time, but increasingly to deal with 
short to long term uncertainty over IT system production and management. Users ask for solutions able to 
protect them against uncertainty, granting interoperability, bug resolution, the satisfaction of new needs and 
the integration of technical advances  . The trade-off between available solutions is not posed in terms of 
their cost of acquisition but of their “TCO” (total cost of ownership), in which the future costs and the costs 
for  granting  interoperability  and  adaptability  have  to  be  estimated.  This  is  precisely  what  architects, 
business programs and platform producers sell to skilled users, aware of these problems and signals. On 
these markets the FLOSS organization seems to represent an asset for producers,  who can display their 
involvement and succeed in building sustainable business models (see the examples of RedHat, MySQL or, 
in  France  Linagora).  But,  as  explained  before,  this  is  only  an  asset  if  the  market  regards  FLOSS  as 
providing a value added to the product, i.e. if this brings the users a potential for increasing their utility. 
How and why may those different users contribute directly or indirectly to FLOSS projects? First of all, 
contribution  does  not  necessary  imply  code  development  but  can  take  various  forms  in  the  product 
development  and improvement.  Users  have to  be  considered  as  valuable  “sources  of  innovation”  (Von 
Hippel),  not  only for  program testing  and  debugging  but  also  for  improving  the  product  usability  and 
performances. People decide to contribute if they get interested by the product, or if they have a problem, in 
which case they can either report the problem directly or through an intermediary, the supplier for instance, 
that allows the user to pass from a passive to an active use of the project.
Actually, the users, understood as the persons choosing the solution (thus not always being the “end-users”), 
are rather  different  from one market  to another,  causing the  competitive  advantage to  rely on different 
features. 
Let  us  distinct  three  main  types  of  users  according to  their  relation  to  the  product  and the  technology 
(Zimmermann 1995, Kogut and Metiu 2001, von Hippel 1988, 2002). The first is the category of “Naïve 
customers or users” (that we denote N) who are not endowed with noticeable technical skills and do not 
individually weigh  very much  in  economic  terms.  The  second  is  the  category of  “Kogut-Metiu  Users” 
(KM)11 who are not able to contribute to software development but can generate new features or innovations 
by revealing their own needs. Above all, they represent an irreplaceable testing and debugging base. KM 
users are sensitive to price and quality arguments The third category is that of the “Von Hippel Users” (VH) 
who act  as  “sources  of  innovation”  (Von Hippel,  1988)  able  to  contribute  to software  development  by 
proposing  improvements  or  modifications,  developing  it  by  themselves  or  at  least  able  to  design  the 
technical specifications.
Users  play a double  role,  deriving from both their  economic and technical  standing.  Depending on the 
market, and especially their bargaining power in it, the users are more or less able to select the (technical) 
offers.  At  one  extreme,  users  and  contracts  in  the  global  service/architects  market  are  related  to  large 
structures, with substantial  buying capacities and generally endowed with significant technical skills. So 
they are  likely to influence economic and technical  choices.  At  the  other  extreme low price  computers 
address a mass market where individual users, in their vast majority have little budget and/or few skills. 
Their influence on market evolution is negligible at an individual level but of global importance in terms of 
elasticity to prices.  But this analysis should be nuanced in the case of intermediation by a “prescriber”, who 
11 In reference to the notion of « frontier-users » put forward by Kogut and Metiu (2001)
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orders and defines the characteristics for a large number of machines, destined for mass distribution by his 
own means  (local  government  for  secondary schools  in  France12,  education  in  rural  area  in  developing 
countries13, ...) That's the reason why, when speaking about the “user”, we mean the person who negotiates 
or chooses the characteristics of the good, who is not always the end user.
Of course different types of users are co-existing in any given market. But the dispersion of users' skills in 
the  related  technology and more  particularly in  software  doesn't  follow the same distribution  from one 
segment to another. Even if  skilled users are likely to be found in any market, they may represent a too 
small  share to play a significant  role in it  and catch the interest  the concerned  firms for their  specific 
demand. Conversely, thanks to the Internet, a handful of very talented users around the world can weigh 
enough together to develop a FLOSS alternative to private offers  and contribute  to the emergence of a 
FLOSS business offer. So, what we denote users' skills appears as a subtle mix between competences and 
number, from wich could yield a weighted sum of competences.  
2. What we can learn from the markets?
There is a wide diversity of actors in the industry in terms of both products and size. Successive waves of 
innovations  and  company  strategies  have  led  to  a  progressive  reshaping  of  the  industry  borders  and 
structure.  For  example,  Internet  has  impacted  the  software  production,  pushing firms  to  integrate  more 
services in their offers, designing new ways of selling software bases applications, such as Saas (software as 
a  service)  (Cusumano,  2004,  pp  86-127;  Campbell-Kelly  &  Garcia-Swartz,  2007),   However,  the 
foundations  of  the  industry  have  remained  unchanged,  since  those  described  by  Gérard-Varet  & 
Zimmermann (1985),  Zimmermann (1995),  Steinmueller  (1996),  and Cusumano (2004):  IT products  are 
built  by assembling hardware and software units in a given architecture,  and these products (isolated or 
integrated into networks)  are  used as  parts  of  information  systems  and solutions.  On the  basis  of  such 
technical  organization,  it  is  then possible  to distinguish three  large types  of  “vertical  specialization”:  i. 
component producers, ii. computers and IT devices suppliers, iii. software editors and service companies 
providing applications.
All these segments are concerned with software production, as even chipset manufacturers have to deal with 
the operating systems embeded in the machine integrating their component. They provide drivers for these 
operating systems, and their incentive to use and develop FLOSS drivers for free operating systems (such as 
Linux) is a growing function of such systems market size. Since the beginning of the 2000s, some firms like 
ATI indeed offer such compatible drivers. But, this remains a marginal contribution, and should not have 
any immediate serious impact  on the structure of the FLOSS development organization. So we will  not 
investigate further the strategies towards FLOSS in this segment of the industry.
Remain what is traditionally defined as the hardware part (the machines) and the software part (software and 
services), with, in between the operating system.
The hardware.
Hardware  is  increasingly various,  from mainframes  to  netbooks,  and  from dedicated  devices  (personal 
communication  tools,  video  game  or  music  players)  to  the  “swiss  knife  machines”  which  are  modern 
computers.
Looking at these markets from the dominant user skill prism helps to understand the  adoption of FLOSS 
within the industry.
1. In the servers market, producers have habitually provided proprietary solutions with proprietary Unix14. 
Here suppliers are dealing with highly-skilled VH clients that can make an essential  contribution in the 
context  of  FLOSS opening. The rise of PC servers has permitted some users to avoid such a bundling 
problem;  moreover,  using  Linux  allows  a  cheaper  offer  (vertical  advantage)  reusing  Unix  programs 
12 With the aim to provide “a computer for each pupil”: http://www.ordina13.com/, http://www.ordi35.fr/
13 See,  for  instance,  the  competition  between  Microsoft  and  Mandriva  to  supply  17,000  computers  in  Nigeria. 
http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/government-law/public-sector/news/index.cfm?newsid=6124
14 See West (2003) for a full discussion of FLOSS strategies in that sector .
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(content) portfolio. Thus some firms have been able to widen the servers market from VH users capable of 
managing their systems by themselves to KM clients, sensitive to prices, but also to the quality of a PC 
server fitted out with Linux. So new entries have been experienced like the Cobalt15 one, but the main actors 
of the Unix “world” have also rapidly developed their  own offers,  cutting down the sources of vertical 
differentiation16.
2. The segment of netbooks, and low price computers (LPC) is a mass market where naïve clients are the 
driving force behind demand, and competition is overall based on prices. When Asus entered the market 
with its eee-PC, it used Linux for price reasons, because Microsoft Windows Vista was too costly in terms 
of resources needed and price to be competitive. Since, considering the success of this market, Microsoft has 
designed a specific, downgraded version of Windows XP for these computers17. It is worth noting that, since 
the middle of 2007, Dell proposes Ubuntu Linux distribution on ones of its first price laptops18. 
3. Between these two cases there is the high quality computers (HQC) market, ie computers for firms or 
computers used to play games, computers requiring good, up-to-date performances. In that segment, exigent 
users, or frontier, KM users seems to be dominant.  It is worth noting that in this desktop market, the main 
push in favour of  open source,  for  the time being, is  driven by organizations or  institutions  (which we 
consider as VH users) that take decisions to equip a large number of end-users. Examples are the French 
“Assemblée Nationale” (French Congress) that has contracted with a service company to install Linux on all 
the computers provided to MPs19,  or the initiatives of the Nigerian20 and Macedonian21 governments for 
schools, or in the industry, the French automaker Peugeot22. 
So,  today, HQC producers may find it hard to switch from Windows to Linux, because this would mean 
either  acquiring new skills  (OS management  and improvement),  or  sub-contracting this  maintenance  to 
Linux editors (RedHat, SuSE,...) which may lead to another dependence and to conflict relations with the 
dominant provider. Nevertheless, a possible future evolution in this sense is likely to arise from the pressure 
of corporate and VH customers becoming more aware of the potentialities of switching to FLOSS. It is 
worth noting that the Linux offered by HP is part of the enterprise offers branch23. In the near future most of 
the HQCs will probably switch to debundling their machines from the associated OS, to  segment more their 
offer between VH users with the Linux offer and KM users with Windows.
4. Dedicate digital devices represent another intermediate case with less skilled customers (KM+N) and a 
weak degree of involvement on the part of commercial actors into FLOSS, and mainly  for compatibility and 
absorptive capacity purpose. 
At one extreme,  in the games consoles  segment  but  also to a lesser  extent  in the music  player  market, 
proprietary formats have introduced, a strong bundle of hardware-software-content and FLOSS products are 
non-existent. Thanks to the MP3 standard or new existing or emerging open standards like Ogg, new entries 
are always possible in segments like the music players market, but the main actors, like Apple, remain on a 
strict proprietary strategy. On the contrary, barriers remain high on the video game players market due to the 
scarcity of independent games capable of running on Linux, unlike the PS2, Xbox and other proprietary 
standards games. Moreover, when they exist, such games seem harder to obtain for simple users. 
15 Cobalt  was  bought  by  SUN,  which  dissolved  the  products  into  its  own  offer.  See 
http://www.sun.com/hardware/serverappliances/eol.html
16 It worth noting that, on the contrary, SUN, being the leader on the UNIX market, has been reluctant to adopt Linux and is today 
the server constructor which has the most difficulties to adapt its business model, with recurrent losses.
17Eee-PC has been the “most wanted 2007 Christmas gift”, according to the constructor, http://eeepc.asus.com/global/
18http://www.dell.com/content/topics/segtopic.aspx/linux_3x?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs
19 http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/software/0,39044164,61970345,00.htm
20 http://www.zdnet.co.uk/talkback/0,1000001161,39290511-39001070c-20088736o,00.htm .
21 http://www.linuxtoday.com/infrastructure/2007091902626NWDPPB
22http://www.informationweek.com/news/management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=201400082
23 http://h71028.www7.hp.com/enterprise/cache/309906-0-0-0-121.html
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On  the  contrary,  there  are  lots  of  FLOSS  products  for  Personal  Communication  Tools,  or  Mobile 
Computers24. Some are proposed by VH users, other by the constructors: :
- if the leader, Nokia only soldl an Internet tablet based on Linux and a development community25, there are 
lots of open-source projects around Symbian (partly owned by Nokia, partly by Sony-Ericsson)26, mainly 
dedicated to tools for developing applications (libraries, development tools, etc.) and Samsung proposes the 
first smart phones based on Linux27;
- the PDA Operating system editor Palmsource is working on the integration of its product on a Linux kernel 
on its products28.
For the same reasons as for PC computers,  we hardly see naïve or KM people switch from an installed 
operating system to a FLOSS one. So constructors will continue to drive the market and decide what they 
integrate  in  their  offer.  Implementing  Linux  on  PCT  devices  may  appear  as  a  good  strategy  to  limit 
differentiation to the core competences of the manufacturers. Operating systems are not at the heart of the 
products  differentiation which is  more based on ergonomic aspects  and hardware characteristics.  In the 
absence of a still established de facto standard, as it stands in the PC market, Linux is to be considered by 
PCT suppliers, as it is free of charge and benefits from a community of developer-users capable to develop 
new features and new products outside  any proprietary control.  In fact,  similarly to the PC market,  the 
challenge is the choice of a platform (Operating System) to build the product.  Palm is also good example of 
a company which after having sold its OS division, is now turning toward Linux. 
The software.
According to Cusumano (2004, chap. 2), this market can be splited between service and product, and for the 
product side between business specialized offers and global, platform offers. We will follow this distinction 
here.
1. In the software platform market, the Linux distribution market is another very good illustration of 
the key role of the demand. Linux publlishers, like RedHat, SuSE, Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft), have 
been among the first commercial actors to enter the market using FLOSS. This could appear to be  obvious 
on a mass market with rather naive users and a significant price-based competition. But today, the retail 
store sales of OS packages represent a negligible part of the revenue of such firms29, and a major part is 
targeted to the business market.
One might explain this fact by the development of broadband connection thanks to ADSL. But we believe a 
more important explanation lies in the skills of the users and the construction of the offer. Consumers buy 
computers  with  an  OS already installed  and few of  them are  skilled  enough to  install  a  different  one. 
Additionally there are no incentives to do so because the pre-installed OS has already been paid for with the 
computer.  So,  the  diffusion  of  FLOSS  OS  on  desktop/laptop  PCs  depends  more  on  the  strategies  of 
constructors, as discussed above, than on direct installation by users. And for VH people wanting to install 
Linux on their PC, other, more technically oriented distributions exist, like Debian, and there is no need to 
pay for these distributions, available for download on the Web.
On the emerging OS for PC server market, things work differently. Most of the users, of VH or KM type,  
are aware of the technical questions involved in installing and configuring an OS. It is also easier to buy a 
24 See, for instance, http://tuxmobil.org/ a web site dedicated to Linux and mobile computers.
25 Nokia  770  Internet  Tablet:  http://www.nokiausa.com/770/1,7841,feat:1,00.html.  Development  community: 
http://www.maemo.org/
26 In June 2008, Nokia announced to be acquiring the whole share of Symbian and open source it under Eclipse license. See the  
Symbian foundation Web site: http://www.symbianfoundation.org/
27 http://linuxdevices.com/news/NS2854558742.html 
28Palm and  Linux:  http://news.com.com/2102-1041_3-6175171.html?tag=st.util.print.  The  web  site  dedicated  by  Palm to  open 
source: http://www.palmsource.com/opensource/.
29 RedHat  stopped  this  activity (see  financial  report  2006,  p.  31);  the  consumer  market  (including distributors,  OEM sales,  e-
commerce and Club) represented 2.54M€ (45% of the total earnings) showing a 23.4% decrease for Mandriva 2005-2006 fiscal year;  
SuSE has been bought by Novell, so these revenues are diluted.
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machine without an operating system installed, and the relative price of the OS is lower. FLOSS gives them 
access to a cheaper but also more open and more adaptable Unix-like operating system, than they could find 
in the traditional Unix offer. This gave FLOSS OS publishers an undeniable competitive advantage, at least 
until that server constructors started to offer PC servers with Linux.
2. In the business software market, the more skilled the users are, in terms of software development 
skills, and (although this is a lesser driving force) in terms of cexpressing functionality requirements, the 
more FLOSS concepts and industrial related offers are likely to spread.
It is clear that the use of open source business software, enabling savings on the cost of licenses, offers a 
price advantage. Moreover, the fact that the customer can evaluate the product without buying a license is 
also an advantage in terms of dissemination. It may even be compulsory when dominant players already 
exist  on the market  (such as the database market  where  MySQL proposes  software  products  competing 
against  those  of  Oracle,  IBM and  Microsoft  who  represent  more  than  80 %  of  the  market)  or  when 
customers are highly sensitive to price (such as the ERP market which increasingly concerns SMEs and 
where  open-source  products  like  ERP5 or  tiny ERP are  now available).  This  strategy also  enables  the 
association  of  a  corporate  brand with  a  product,  therefore  increasing the  notoriety  of  the  firm through 
distribution  of  the  latter.  Moreover,  on  these  technical  markets,  especially  when  the  customers  are 
developers, availability of the code promotes cooperation. The producer approves the contributions, ensures 
stability of the tool and helps developers to use it. If some individual contributor becomes important (in 
terms of contribution volume/quality/innovative aspect),  s/he  may be hired by a producer,  with reduced 
recruitment costs and risks (ACT or MySQL but also some small services companies are using this method). 
By  contributing  to  innovation,  the  developers  (and  possibly  companies  using  the  tool),  are  therefore 
guaranteed that their needs will be taken into account more quickly and integrated into the product (which is 
a fundamental factor in reducing costs, according to Von Hippel 1988).
Obviously, capitalizing on existing products is more difficult, even if, as Muselli (2002) explained, with the 
entire control of the software , a dual license strategy can be set up to sell the program when requested by 
the customers (because, for example, they want to integrate it in a larger, closed, package). This is what 
companies like Qt or MySQL offer. But, today, the main source of revenue again comes from services, more 
precisely what  we  call  the  “3A services”  (assistance,  assurance  and  adaptation  to  the  use).  Otherwise, 
adaptation  services  must  be  significant  enough  to  finance  development  of  the  product.  Therefore,  the 
objective is to transform a handicap (significant investments) into a commercial advantage, by increasing the 
business feedback from users and by considering openness as a way to reduce transaction costs and as a 
signal of quality.  Currently,  the main evolution for those firms is to switch from a demand pull strategy 
(functionalities are developed to stimulate/create the demand) to an 'on-demand' development (development 
when required and paid for or carried out by the users).
This  explains  why open  source  business  products  are  developed  mainly  in  “business”  software  (ERP, 
computer infrastructure software like compilers), where users ready to pay for configuration, maintenance or 
assistance services are numerous. But the scope could easily extend to many technical/professional software 
activities.
3. As  far  as  the  services  of  the “architects”  market is  concerned,  as  Horn  (2004)  points  out, 
assembling components requires access to the source codes (problem of compatibility), and their adaptation 
to different  needs (of users and other components).  They must  be available in the form of open-source 
software ( therefore legally modifiable).
The competitive advantage in using free software, in addition to price, is therefore  the ability to offer an 
assembled set of components with greater interoperability,  which should increase the quality of the final 
product, on a market where the quality of services is one of the recurrent problems (see De Bandt, 1995). 
Revenues are generated by assembling and adaptation services, as is the case for any traditional  service 
company.
The only uncertainty about the model concerns the availability of the components: who will develop them 
and who will maintain them? Moreover, the customers of these companies may already have (proprietary) 
programs installed that need to be taken into account. In the end, an open source strategy could even be a 
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guarantee of means (maximum use of free software), but not a guarantee of the results (use of only free 
software), unless the customer requests this, since in this situation, he keeps the last word.
Two kinds of firms use FLOSS today : newcomers who specialize in FLOSS architecture, using FLOSS as 
vertical (price) and horizontal differentiation asset, and incumbents, such as IBM for its service activities30. 
Traditional service firms like Cap Gemini are more agnostic with regard to the technologies used and the 
intellectual property regime involved. They will generally follow the customers' demand which depends on 
their  ability  to  keep  up  with  the  development  of  the  project.  These  customers  are  most  often  large 
organizations, skilled computer users that are receptive to the opportunity to integrate the most advanced 
software  components,  developed  under  open  licenses.  So  they  are  becoming  increasingly  involved  in 
FLOSS as the market grows and matures31.
Table 1 below summarize the main type of users likely to be found in each sub-sector of the IT industry. 
Table 1. The dominant user type in each IT sub-sector.
Actors/  
products
Dominant user type Comments
Components 
VH
Component producers supply hardware manufacturers, aware of the quality and quality-price aspects of 
the components they will use, as well as the effects of brand reputation of these latter as a signal of 
quality for their own products.
Servers VH The clients are computer-literate people, able to express needs in technical terms, to develop software for 
their own needs, and to innovate by themselves.
High Quality 
Computers 
KM HQC users are somewhat less computer-literate than server users; they can be characterized as “intensive 
frontier users”. So the market is looking at a good performance-to-price ratio.
Low Price 
Computers 
N +. KM  LPC is a mass market; users have no particular skills except in the case of intermediation by a 
“prescriber”.
PCT   N + KM PCT and players are relatively mass markets, but some advanced users (more in the PCT field and 
particularly in the PDA market) can play a constructive role in the development of new features. 
Players N
Platform 
producers KM + N
For the OS, as for hardware components, most of the end-users buy a computer with an OS already 
installed. So the actual users in our sense of the term are computer manufacturers, service companies and 
sophisticated end-users capable of installing an alternative operating system for their proper use or the 
use of their customers.
On other platforms (database, middleware), the users are also computer manufacturers, service 
companies and highly-skilled users. 
Business 
solution 
producers 
VH/KM depending on the 
markets
In the business solutions market, users are professionals. They are able to make a technical evaluation of 
the product, to carry out trials and tests. This means that people may have skills in the functional domain 
(what they want, how the software works), and sometimes in the technical one (able to adapt or develop 
software to meet their own needs, especially in the tools for computer professionals market).
Architects N (+VH) Large  firms  and  organizations  include  very  sophisticated  users  (IT  division).  SMEs  or  corporate 
divisions, at local or sectorial level, are clients of very heterogeneous but rather low IT skills. However, 
clients may be quite precise in the definition of the services they need, and so in the specification of the 
application characteristics.
Empirical  observation about firms' involvement in FLOSS development can be  summarize as so: in the 
fields  where  dominant  user's  skill  is  either  high  or  very low,  firms  have invested  into  FLOSS.  When 
dominant user's skill is intermediate, the dominant design remains that of the classical proprietary model. 
More precisely, when dominant user's skill is low, competition is price-based and FLOSS helps to provide a 
cheap solution. When dominant user's skill is high, competition is on quality, services and scalability, and 
30 As explained by Slatter (1992), one of the main strategies for newcomers in technological markets is technological differentiation. 
Basing its offer on new FLOSS products can be seen as a way for new service companies to differentiate.
31 In 2005 Gartner forecasted that « 2008, 95 percent of Global 2000 organizations will have formal open-source acquisition and 
management strategies » (http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?doc_cd=125868)
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FLOSS because it is modular, helps to design (so with complementary investments from firms), a better 
offer.  But  between this  two polar  cases,  for  dominant  user  rewarding quality for  a  low-medium price, 
FLOSS may not be a good alternative to proprietary solutions.
To validate these finding,  in the next section, we present  a theoretical competition model in which two 
firms with contrasting attitudes toward intellectual property protection compete on a market characterized 
by a given distribution of users' skills. We will see how this distribution may drive both the nature (price vs 
quality) and the issue (market shares and profit levels) of the competition. For this purpose we will give a 
formal conceptual  base to the notion of dominant  user's skill, following the  underlying assumption that 
users' skills distribution usually takes a unimodal shape, centred around a given level of skill.
3. A competition model with users' feedbacks  
Our ambition,  in this  paper,  is  to build  a unified framework that  could embrace both market  and users 
feedback aspects for understanding why firms present such a wide diversity of their degree of involvement 
in FLOSS dynamics. Our assumption, fleshed out by the empirical discussion in the section 2 above, in that, 
beside more usual arguments like the intensity of the competition and the place of software towards the core 
competences of the firm, users' skills represent a major driver of such a variance. The reason is that users' 
skills  are  likely to  explain  both  how users  may valorize  the  intrinsic  performances  of  an  information 
technology system and how they can generate more or less important feedbacks likely to contribute to the 
improvement and evolution of FLOSS products. This implies deciding consequences, on the one hand, on 
the price elasticity of the demand and, on the other hand,  on the building of the quality of the FLOSS 
products.  Such  balance  between  market  and  quality  effects  has  to  be  understood  in  relation  to  the 
distribution  of  users'  skills,  or  to  what  we  call  the  dominant  user's  skill,  in  the  related  markets,  in  a 
competition context.
This is why we undertook to build a competition model  that could catch how the users' skill  level may 
deeply affect  the  competitive  position  of  a  FLOSS involved  firm,  hence  her  strategic  behaviour  when 
competing  against  proprietary  pattern.  The  model  we  develop  in  this  section  is  a  very  simple  one 
confronting one proprietary and one open-source software  suppliers developing and purchasing partially 
substitutable products, vertically differentiated by their level of quality. Market is characterized by a given 
distribution  of  users'  skills  that  determines  both  users'  reservation  price  and  the  capacity  of  FLOSS 
customers to generate feedbacks. Budget constraints are not taken into account at this stage.
The users
We consider each individual user to be characterized by a given level of skill denoted θ ∈ [0,1]. In terms of 
the problem addressed here, this level can be considered as a good proxy of the individual ability to valorise 
quality: information technology products are endowed with a wide usage potential that is actually exploited 
more or less fully,  according to the user’s capabilities.  These capabilities are tightly correlated with the 
user's level of skill in computing: the more skilled, the more he is able to benefit from the technical quality 
of the product32, hence the greater his utility for adopting.
In a pretty standard way we use a linear expression of the individual utility obtained, for a user of level θ , 
from a product of quality s>0 sold at price p such as
U= θ s – p if he buys the product;
   = 0 otherwise.
So θs is the reservation price of a user of skill level θ for a product of quality s 
Users' skills distribution 
32See for instance Blili, Raymond and Rivard (1998)
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It is considered that the weight of the user population is normalized to 1.
A given market is then characterized by the distribution of skills given by a function
f: [0,1] → R+ : ∫
0
1
f d =1 (1)
The suppliers
Let l denote the open-source firm and m the proprietary firm.
Both sell a substitutable product vertically differentiated through a quality level s > 0.
The proprietary firm invest a given amount cm > 0 and obtains a level sm = m (cm ) of the quality level of its 
product. The production function m is  positive increasing and quasi-concave. This permits to take account 
from the two following aspects. First the more a firm invests in quality, the better this quality. Second, the 
efficiency of this investment is decreasing as it is harder and harder to improve the quality of a production ; 
more particularly, in the computer market, this needs to develop dedicated adaptation, thus services, which 
are less productive (see Cusumano, 2004, chapter 2). 
Her product is sold at price pm 
The quality sl of the product delivered by the open-source firm depends on both the level of investment cl of 
l to its development, creation of ad-ons and complimentary services ... and the amount of the users' feedback 
effects from its user base. It is sold at price pl .
In a first step we will describe the question out of any feedback effect, then in a second step we will 
introduce those later.
It is considered here that sl  represents the additional quality provided by l to an open-source product freely 
available on Internet. So the actual quality of the open-source product can be written as the sum  Sl =  sl +  sd 
where sd is the standard quality of the product downloaded on Internet, hence at price p0 = 0.
So the actual  utility for the user to adopt  the open-source product  from l at price  p l is U= Sl θ - pl  . 
Meanwhile as far as he will accept to pay only for the additional quality sl  the utility taken into account for 
the competition model is the sole additional utility provided by the open-source product as purchased by l, 
that is Ul= sl θ - pl 
Proposition 1 : Production technologies
If both firms have the same concave production technology, then the open-source firm gets a lower 
efficiency when she works on and only on her owns efforts, without drawing benefits from any users' 
feedback effect.
Proof
Let's consider a production function m twice differentiable increasing and concave, in order to satisfy the 
characteristics of decreasing returns of the production function.
The proprietary firm reaches the quality level sm = m (cm )
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As far as the open-source firm is concerned, suppose l doesn't make use of any users' feedback effect. Then 
the conditions of production of an additional  quality sl  to the the basic quality sd of the product  freely 
available  on  Internet  are  equivalent  to  those  that  would  be  experienced  by m after  having reached  an 
equivalent level of basic quality sd and aiming to produce a better level let's say sm =  sd + ∆sm .
m being invertible,  ∃!c0 ≥ 0 : sd = m(c0) and m being concave it is then possible to write
sl (c)= m (c +c0) - m (c0) < m(c)=sm 
Thus
  sl (c) / c  < m(c) / c = sm (c) / c 

We have then to introduce the users' feedback effect into the production of the open-source quality.
Definition 1: User s' feedback
The users' feedback effect τl related to a given market share Θl   is measured as the cumulated skill level of 
the user base for the open-source product;
l=∫
l
 f d  (2)
where Θl  is the user base of l , assumed to be compact.
When taking in account this cumulated skill level of the user base we position our model one step beyond 
the classical network externalities effects that only consider the size of the related market share.
So investing an amount cl  the open-source firm l reaches, for a market share  Θl   a quality level expressed as
sl = q (cl  , τl) (3)
where τl is the amount of the feedback effect as measured by (2).
q is assumed to be twice differentiable increasing and quasi-concave in  cl  and τl   and q(0,.) =  0
Competitive condition
According to proposition 1 and given that the feedback  effect  is bounded by l=1 , the condition 
for allowing the open-source firm to obtain a higher level of quality than the proprietary one can be 
written 
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c
0
s
d
 m(c)
m(c+c
0
)-m (c
0
)
∃ C > 0 : q(C , 1) > m(C)
Denote C0 = Inf {C > 0 : q(C , 1) > m(C)} (4)
Then
∀c > C0 , q(c , 1) > m(c)
The linear case
A simple expression of q is given as linear in cl  and τl   by
sl = λ cl  (1+ τl ) (5)
with  λ > 0
so that sl (0, .)= 0 in so far as when l invests 0,  she can only sell what she takes from the community and 
doesn't provide any added value in terms of interface, adaptation or services that could justify a positive 
price pl  > 0
Accordingly the level of quality reached by the proprietary firm is given by
sm = µ cm
with  µ > λ  in compliance with  proposition 1
In this linear case, the competitive condition can then be written 2λ > µ and this is true for any c.
Proposition 2:  Market shares
Given a level of prices ( pl , pm ) and qualities   ( sl , sm ) 
if sl < sm then for any user of level  θ choosing the open-source software,  ∀ θ' < θ ,  θ' chooses open-
source software
if sl > sm then for any user of level  θ choosing the open-source software,  ∀ θ' > θ ,  θ' chooses open-
source software
Proof
θ adopts the open source software if and only if Ul (θ ) > Um (θ ) 
⇔ sl θ - pl > sm θ - pm
when sl < sm  (and pl < pm )
⇔ 
pm− pl
sm−sl
which remains true for any θ' < θ
and symmetrically for  sl > sm  

Corollary:
Let  denote the value of θ at which a user has no preference between l and m
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=
pm− pl
sm−sl
(6)
  is called the indifferent agent.
Let's also denote θ0 the minimal level of the users entering the market.
When sl < sm , 0=
p l
s l
 then   Θl  = [θ0 ,  ]  and  Θm  = [  , 1]
When sm < sl , 0=
pm
sm
 then   Θl  = [  , 1]  and  Θm = [θ0 ,  ]
Definition 2: The dominant user's skill
As seen before, each market in the software industry is characterized by a dominant type of user that we 
have described through a typology as “N”, “K.M.” or “V.H.” according to their skill level in relation to the 
software  product.  Of  course,  this  dominant  type  coexists  with  users  of  different  skill  levels,  but  the 
distribution can be considered as relatively unimodal. Hence, we characterize the level of the dominant user 
not  through the  mean  value of  θ among the  population  but  through a  stronger  criterion  of  stochastic 
dominance, meaning that if f and g are the distribution of users’ skills characterizing two markets, then
g >> f ⇔ ∀    ∈  [0,1[ , ∫

1
 g d ∫

1
 f d  (7)
This criterion expresses a shifting of the mass of the users from a lower to a higher level of skills.
The game:
In this  model,  strategic decisions  are taken simultaneously,  each agent  formulating rational  expectations 
about the behaviour of his competitor. Thus we consider that the level of investment of each firm is decided 
while taking count of the expected skill level of the indifferent agent thus of the respective market shares 
and the expected feedback effect for the open-source firm. However we model the strategic interaction of 
the  two  firms  as  a  two-stages  game,  since  there  are  two strategic  variables  for  each  i  ∈ {l  ,  m},  the 
investment ci and the price pi . In the first stage, each firm chooses a level of investment ci that permits them 
to get an intrinsic quality level q (cl  , 0) and m (cm ) respectively.  The second stage is a price competition in 
which each firm chooses a price  pi , this price has a recursive effect on the level of the indifferent agent, 
thus on the respective market shares and the level of the users' feedback for the open-source firm τl thus the 
level of quality she's actually reaching sl = q (cl  , τl) . So that   is given through an implicit equation of the 
strategic variables (cl , cm ) and (pl , pm ).
The competitors pay-offs can then be written following the relative level of realized qualities as follows
       Πl Πm
sl >  sm [1−F  ] p l−cl [F  −F 0] pm−cm
sl <  sm [F  −F 0] p l−cl [1−F  ] pm−cm
15
Where F is the cumulated distribution of users' skills and    0=Min[
pl
sl
,
pm
sm
]  (8)
Proposition 3 : Low users' skills
When the dominant user's skill is low enough, the open-source firm invests little, and stays at a lower 
level of quality than the proprietary one , targeting a relatively price-sensitive market.
Proof:
∀   defined as above,  l=∫
l
 f d ∫
0
1
 f d =
Thus 
sl = q (cl  , τl) ≤  q (cl  , τ )
According to Proposition 2
q (cl  , 0) <  m (cl )
q being continuously increasing, there exists  τ0> 0 such as ∀ η <  τ0  , q (cl  , η) <  m (cl
 
)
( In the linear case, such condition can be written −1  )
Then, the proprietary firm may fix a price pm generating a positive profit for her while preventing the open 
source firm from targeting a higher or equal level of quality with non negative profits.
So l targets a low level of quality, fixes a low price and maximise her profit by enlarging as much as 
possible her market share [0 , ]  .

Proposition 4:
If the feedback effect is efficient enough, when the dominant user's skill  is high enough the open-
source firm may invest much, obtain a higher level  of  quality as the proprietary one, targeting a 
relatively quality sensitive market. The proprietary firm invests less, aims a lower level of quality and 
targets a relatively less skilled and more price sensitive market segment.
Proof :
If all the population is concentrated at skill level 1, then the global feedback is maximal at the value =1
Let's suppose l wins the whole market.
At level of investment cl , l reaches the quality sl = q (cl  , 1)
∀cl  ≥ C0 , then sl > m (cl )
The pay-off of l can be written Πl = pl  - cl   > 0 if and only if pl  > cl   
For any user, the utility of adopting the FLOSS product is Ul = sl  - pl  = q (cl  , 1) - pl  
then Ul > 0  ⇔  pl  < q (cl  , 1) ( pl  < 2 λ cl  in the linear case)
16
So l may fix her price pl   under the double constraint cl  < pl   < q (cl  , 1) (9) 
what requires  q (cl  , 1)> cl  ( λ > ½ in the linear case).
Entry threat :
m may threaten the l's monopoly and capture the whole market if and only if there exists a level cm of m's 
investment and a price pm such that
Um (cm , pm) > Ul (cl , pl)
⇔  m ( cm ) - pm > q (cl  , 1) - pl
and
Πm (cm , pm) > 0 ⇔  pm >  cm
as for l, m has to fix her price under the double constraint  cm  < pm   < m (cm ) (11)
what requires  m (cm )> cm  ( µ > 1 in the linear case).
As far as  q (cl  , 1) - cl   > m ( cm ) - cm , 
l may prevent this threat of entry by fixing a price pl   < q (cl  , 1) - (m ( cm ) - cm )
In the linear case, m ( c ) - c  is growing with c so it would be possible for m to capture the market by 
investing at a high enough level cm . But when introducing budget constraints from the users side this doesn't 
hold any more as far as l invest at a high enough level.
In the concave case conversely, the differential  m ( c ) - c is decreasing with high c . m may capture the 
market, by targeting a lower quality price if and only if 
∆m = max (m ( c ) - c) > ∆l = max c 
l  ≥ c 0 
 (q (cl  , 1) - cl )
∆m , respectively ∆l correspond to values of c giving a slope equal to one for m(c) and q(c,1) respectively and 
their respective widths depend on the respective concavity of the two curves.
So the more efficient the feedback effect, the more the open-source curve moves away from the diagonal 
and the open-source firm may deter the proprietary threat to entry.
Even if the proprietary firm cannot enter the market, this potential threat prevents l to fix a monopoly price.
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More generally, when the dominant user's skill is high, if the production technology conditions and budget 
constraints allow it, the open-source firm invests much, targets a high level of quality and a quality sensible 
market.

In conclusion, we can say that if the dominant user is unskilled, and so price-taker, FLOSS may be a good 
strategy if it enables the firm to supply a product at a lower price than the proprietary one, but requiring a 
low level  of  investment  to  adapt  or  improve  the  FLOSS solution.  In  the  opposite  situation,  when  the 
dominant user is very skilled, an offer based on FLOSS and a high level of complementary services can 
succeed. This result is in accordance with the work of Henkel (2006), who shows in a duopoly model that “a 
regime with compulsory revealing can lead not only to higher profits, but also to higher product qualities 
than a proprietary regime”. In the intermediate situations, the FLOSS strategy may be less efficient than the 
proprietary one.
4. Industrial and managerial issues.  
The model we have introduced in section 3 permits us to enlighten how the distribution of users' skills on 
the different markets can contribute to explain the variance of firms' involvement into FLOSS. At the heart 
of this question lies the possibility to arouse and mobilize feedbacks from the users and to appropriate them 
as an input of the firm production function. 
The basic assumption here is that the more skilled the users are, the more they are likely to provide different 
forms of returns that can be used for improving the product, so the more they can be considered as a value-
added source that may play a role in the firm's business model.
This question has undoubtedly something to deal with that of the relations between firms and communities. 
But it is much wider in so far as it embraces all the types of users that can be found on the different markets. 
Beyond communities considered as formed by developers contributing to the development-improvement of a 
product they usually make and use, the feedback effects an open-source firm has to absorb are those from 
their customers. These latter do not necessary behave as community members and are not always capable of 
contributing to software development. So, in the open source model, firms have to play a coordination and 
go-between role with the contributing users, coordinating, making coherent their contributions, but also to 
manage assistance and specific services to the use for the less skilled or the ready to pay customers.
There is a reciprocal effect between the open-source firm and her customer base. In the one side, the open-
source firm has to internalise the feedback effects from the users into her production process in order to 
improve the quality of its commercial offer. In the other side, customers consider that, as far as the firm 
benefits from positive feedbacks from her customer base and from open-source community, she may provide 
a product endowed with good properties as summarized by what we called the “3A services” (assistance, 
assurance and adaptation to the use).
In application markets, all the recent new entries have been based on the competitive advantage drawn from 
the FLOSS label: FLOSS OS editors (like RedHat), FLOSS database producers (MySQL), FLOSS service 
companies (VA Linux, or Linagora in France). Today, incumbents are also assuming this strategy (IBM with 
Eclipse, SAP opening its data base system, even Microsoft opening some of its technical tools...) This could 
shortly become the benchmark of industrial organization on these markets, inducing a growing control of 
FLOSS development by commercial firms and a spectacular enlargement of open IP regimes in the software 
field. 
But  there  is  a  border  where  the  consumers'  feedback  become  too  weak  to  play  a  significant  role  for 
improving enough the quality.  When it is the case, they do notcontribute enough to the open-source firm's 
competitive advantage, throwing her back, as formalized in the model, to a less efficient situation as her 
proprietary competitors. 
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What the model also shows in that case, (where the users are not skilled enough to permit the open-source 
firm to provide a better quality product than the proprietary one), is that the FLOSS firm will shift to an 
alternative market strategy.  She will target the less skilled customers and enlarge the market base towards 
users with lower reservation prices.   This is also a traditional  behavior in the computer industry,  where 
successively Digital entered the market creating the mini-computers thanks to the transistors, and Apple did, 
creating the personal computer thanks to the micro-processor. Linux and Open source technologies would 
play the same role making possible the provision of under $200 notebooks and under $100 computer for 
Third World countries MIT project. The limit situation consists in purchasing the standard product as freely 
downloadable on Internet but ready to run for the user, avoiding him heavy searching costs, all the more 
worrying if he is unskilled. So the open-source firm value-added lies for those customers in providing them 
with the appropriate product and complementary services like training, assistance and advices. This is, for 
instance, the business model RedHat or Mandriva developed at the beginning, with the Linux distribution on 
CD, and a model already announced by Ousterhout (1999). It also appears close to the common explanation 
that the FLOSS product steps in as a complement to what the firm actually sells, either hardware (Asus with 
Eee  PC)  or  services  (Aol-Netscape  sponsoring  Firefox  Browser  to  give  access  to  its  information  and 
entertainment services) and it is to be said that we do not know successful stories based on a pure strategy of 
that kind.
Of course, one might oppose the argument that such strategies have a flavour of free-riding and can yield to 
demotivate  the  most  involved people  in the  communities,  seeing others  drawing profits  from their  own 
benevolent  work33.  However,  by adopting FLOSS products,  those  firms  take part  to  the  enlargement  of 
FLOSS users'  network  related  to  a  given  open  software  like  the  operating  system Linux  or  the  office 
application suite “Open Office”. In a competition regime in which the battle for network externalities and 
then standards play a crucial role, this can be considered as a strong help in favour of FLOSS, that can win 
at least community's neutrality if not  kind approbation.
Our model bridges those two polar situations where the strategy of the open-source firms is respectively 
targeting either quality or price sensible markets. It also echoes an old managerial choice firms have to do 
entering the computer market (Cusumano 2004): either being a service company or a product company.  
Observable FLOSS strategies and our model converge confirming what Cusumano explained: 1) if there is a 
market for service, ie if customers are ready to pay for it (because they understand the added value of this  
service), it is worth doing it. But if not, firms must concentrate on selling quite standard products and to bet 
on the economy of scale. 2) there is a point where it is better stopping investing in services, because the 
costs are growing quicker than the market share or the willingness to pay. 
In between, the opportunity for an open-source strategy will not vanish for all that, but will tightly depend 
on the technical nature of the product and the production process, more particularly the possibility to take 
advantage of medium skilled users base. One crucial aspect in this concern will be the importance of test 
tasks facing the development of the product. Kogut and Metiu (2001) show that these “frontier-users” not 
skilled enough to contribute by code writing are nevertheless capable to bring a decisive contribution to 
software improvement by constituting a huge test and debugging base in a field where maintenance costs 
can  reach  50  to  80%  of  the  software  budget…An  interesting  illustration  is  given  by  automate  crash 
description programs included in most of the popular desktop FLOSS products (Firefox, Open Office).
When software is not a core competence of the firm, like it is mostly the case  for personal communication 
tools, or low-medium quality computers,  the firm who has rallied to FLOSS has a huge interest to bridge 
her  base  of  low  and  medium  skilled  users  with  the  communities  involved  in  related  software  tools 
development. In one way, she may help the users to find their path in an always widening library of open-
source applications. In the other way she might pay attention to the expression of requirement, satisfactions 
and dissatisfactions of her customers in order both to early identify new needs and the new features they 
could justify and to reverberate the appropriate informations more or less actively within the concerned 
communities of developers.
This is a precious lesson for understanding open innovation model. Even the dominant user's skill being high 
or medium level, these potential feedbacks still have to be organised, coordinated and integrated into the 
33See Foray, Thoron and Zimmermann (2007) for a discussion of that particular point.
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open-source firm production process. First open-source firms have to organise customer services capable to 
consider users not only as a demand for maintenance or assistance services, but also as a valuable source of 
information capable to play a crucial role in a partly decentralized open model of innovation.
Second, for being able to integrate knowledge and innovation from the open-source communities,  open-
source firms have to develop internally efficient capabilities of absorption, essential condition to capitalize 
and internalise  the communities'  contribution  and the users'  feedbacks for  improving their  own product 
quality.  Dahlander  and  Magnusson  (2008)  working  on  the  relations  between  firms  and  open-source 
communities show that those firms need “to develop sufficient absorptive capacity to benefit from external 
developments, not only to identify useful external knowledge, but also to assimilate and apply it”. This is 
reflected in the model  by the partial  complementarity of  the feedbacks with the firm efforts  within the 
production function q, requiring positive investment to give a positive outcome whatever the level of users' 
feedback - q(0, .) = 0-. 
This corresponds to the more general assertion from Cohen and Levinthal (1990) about the necessity for a 
firm to make internal efforts of R&D as a prerequisite for the absorption  of external technology. We may 
formulate the hypothesis that the more skilled the users are, the more involved the firm must be, because of 
the growing level  of  complexity of  the  feedbacks and of  the demand.  The  ultimate  case,  illustrated by 
AdaCore Technology or MySQL being that managing of the open source software community is the specific 
asset of the firm.
Nevertheless,  the  origin  of  the  open-source  rationale  remains  that  of  developer-users  pooling  their 
development efforts for their own needs, aiming at better access to efficient tools for everyone. This is the 
core of the open-source model and, as seen in the paper, the recent move towards commercial structuring 
doesn’t contradict this foundation : either this volunteer collaboration is initiated by individuals or by a firm, 
a key condition of the success is users-developers adhesion.  The management of the relation between an 
open-source firm and the related communities is of crucial  importance as a recent  literature has already 
emphasized. In that respect, another interesting contribution that enlightens interestingly our concern has 
been done by Âgerfalk and Fitzgerald (2008) that did study how firms dealing with communities engage 
themselves  in  open  source  governance.  The  dominant  characteristic  the  authors  have  observed  aims  to 
preserve the co-existence and co-operation of two types of organisation that are based on remote albeit not 
contradictory  rationales,  in  a  nutshell  “not  seeking  to  dominate  and  control  process”,  “providing 
professional management and business expertise” and “helping establish an open and trusted ecosystem”. 
They view such  interaction  as  rather  osmotic  than  parasitic,  as  firm's  resources  reinforce  communities 
sustainability.
These considerations could be easily extended from the sole framework of the communities to the whole 
users base. In this paper, we have insisted on the role that the dominant user's skill plays to permit firms to 
invest into FLOSS development helping them to offer better quality products. In fact, this causality could be 
interestingly reversed taking into account that FLOSS, by mobilizing users expression and creativity in an 
open context, helps these latter to better develop their skills. Proprietary software does not34.
The FLOSS movement  has sometimes been presented as a canonical  model  of  production for the open 
innovation paradigm, and even for the knowledge society. If so, open development may develop in fields 
where users are skilled enough to initiate the development of open knowledge and have enough market 
power to force the traditional producers to shift to an open model.  In such conditions, the open IP regime 
can be seen as a very efficient solution to the Schumpeterian dilemma in so far as it permits a wide diffusion 
of knowledge, while encouraging innovation, as producers are incited to contribute to the development of 
the product they use/sell. This regime could be named   VH open innovation regime, in reference to Von 
Hippel  (1988)'s  seminal  work  on  users  as  innovators.  Open  initiatives  have  been  launched  in  many 
industries, such as biotech, remote sensing and chip design. Most of the time, their chances of success are 
evaluated  in  terms  of  the  motivation  of  the  participants  and  the  stability  of  the  “community”.  Our 
contribution argues for more economic aspects of the evaluation, by taking into account the impact of the 
users in these productions, and their bargaining power.   
34We thank sincerely the anonymous referee who made us this suggestion.
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